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Abstract
Absence-of-Arbitrage (AoA) is the basic assumption underpinning derivatives pricing the-
ory. As part of the OTC derivatives market, the CDS market not only provides a vehicle for
participants to hedge and speculate on the default risks of corporate and sovereign entities, it
also reveals important market-implied default-risk information concerning the counterparties
with which financial institutions trade, and for which these financial institutions have to cal-
culate various valuation adjustments (collectively referred to as XVA) as part of their pricing
and risk management of OTC derivatives, to account for counterparty default risks. In this
study, we derive No-arbitrage conditions for CDS term structures, first in a positive interest
rate environment and then in an arbitrary one. Using an extensive CDS dataset which covers
the 2007-09 financial crisis, we present a catalogue of 2,416 pairs of anomalous CDS con-
tracts which violate the above conditions. Finally, we show in an example that such anomalies
in the CDS term structure can lead to persistent arbitrage profits and to nonsensical default
probabilities. The paper is a first systematic study on CDS-term-structure arbitrage providing
model-free AoA conditions supported by ample empirical evidence.
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1 Introduction
Derivative pricing theory has as its basic assumption that the financial markets are arbitrage-free,
in the sense that there should not exist an opportunity to make a risk-free profit without initial setup
costs. With an appropriate mathematical definition (a non-trivial matter, especially in a continuous-
time framework: see for example Delbaen and Schachermayer (2006, [16]), Absence-of-Arbitrage
can be shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equivalent martingale measure with respect to
which prices can be evaluated as expectations of discounted pay-offs: see for example Bjork [5]
(2005).
The Over-The-Counter or OTC derivatives represent a market with a notional of US$532 tril-
lion (BIS Statistics [2], 2017), including derivatives on foreign exchange, interest rates, commodi-
ties, credit, equities and other derivatives. As part of OTC derivatives market, the Credit Default
Swap (or CDS) not only allows participants to speculate on and hedge credit risks, it also re-
veals market-implied default-risk information about financial institutions’ counterparties. The lat-
ter is critical for the pricing and risk-management of OTC derivatives (especially for non-centrally
cleared ones), in order to properly account for counterparty credit risk in the form of Credit Val-
uation Adjustment or CVA and other valuation adjustments collectively referred to as XVA: see
for example Brigo, Morini and Pallavicini [6] (2013). One of the main lessons learned from the
2007-09 financial crisis is that the market failed to properly account for counterparty default risks
in the pricing and risk management of OTC derivatives. A lot of progresses have been made in this
area since the crisis1. In practice, the post-crisis pricing and risk management of OTC derivatives
in banks consist of two parts, risk-neutral valuation of the derivative by the Front Office assuming
1See for example Brigo, Francischello and Pallavicini for non-linear valuation adjustment pricing framework
(2015, [9]), Crepey et al (2013, [14]) for a BSDE-based (Backward stochastic differential equation) approach and
Burgard and Kjaer (2013,[13]) for a replicating approach for FVA; Green, Kenyon and Dennis (2014, [17]) and Green
and Kenyon (2015, [18]) among others extended the replicating approach to include capital and margin requirements
in forms of KVA (Capital Valuation Adjustment) and MVA (Margin Valuation Adjustment) respectively.
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there is no counterparty-default- risk, and the addition of an array of valuation adjustments con-
ducted by the XVA Desk, also computed by risk-neutral valuation in risk-neutral world. Valuation
adjustments have become standard practice in pricing and risk management of OTC derivatives for
most large banks.
Literature often highlights that a CVA can be seen as a Contingent CDS or CCDS (cf. Brigo,
Morini and Pallavicini [6], 2013), which pays the Loss-Given-Default on the residual net present
value of a given portfolio. A CCDS is a type of credit derivatives whose notional and maturity are
contingent on the time-of-default of an underlying reference entity. To price the CVA or CCDS,
the default risk of the reference entity has to be calibrated to liquid CDS rates in a presumably
arbitrage-free market. However, this element of the CVA pricing has not received much attention;
essentially, the literature typically assumes that the counterparties of financial institutions either
have liquidly quoted CDSs contracts on their names, or that sound proxies are available and that
the CDS market is arbitrage-free. However, as regards the former assumption, as highlighted in
Brummelhuis and Luo (2018a) [10], the vast majority of counterparties of financial institutions
are not liquidly quoted in the CDS market and CDS proxy rates have to be constructed. In that
reference, a CDS-proxy construction method via Machine Learning techniques has been proposed
and shown to be more sound and to produce more accurate results than existing proxy methods:
see Brummelhuis and Luo (2018b) [11], for a benchmarking exercise. Regarding the latter, as
shown below, the CDS market is not as arbitrage-free as assumed in derivatives pricing theory; in
fact, a significant amount of CDS-term-structure arbitrage opportunities exist in the CDS market.
Alternatively, interested readers can find a shorter version of the paper for ML-based CDS Proxy
Construction in Brummelhuis and Luo (2017 [12]).
Using simple arguments we show that, for CDS contracts of varying maturity on a given name,
the CDS-spread times the maturity has to be an increasing function of the maturity. This can be
shown without making any modeling assumptions if the risk-free interest rates are positive. When
risk-free rates can be negative we derive a version of this theorem in which we multiply the CDS-
spreads not by the maturity, but by what we will call the standardized risk-free annuity, which is the
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present value of an annuity paying a standardized interest rate of 1 over the life-time of the CDS
contract (at the same payment dates as the CDS). In the case of positive interest rates this strength-
ens the first condition above, but its derivation assumes the existence of an equivalent martingale
measure or risk-neutral pricing measure2 and the conditional independence of default-times of the
other market variables. These assumptions also underlie current standard practice in banks for
deriving market-implied (or risk-neutral) default probabilities from CDS quotes by the so-called
Bootstrapping approach (see for example O’Kane (2008), [21]) as well as the evaluation of CVAs.
We then found that these absence-of-arbitrage conditions can be violated in CDS markets: see
subsection 1.1 and section 4 below.
Despite the uniquely important role played by the CDS market, there are only a limited number
of studies on CDS-related arbitrage: see Kapadia and Pu (2012, [20]) for an example regarding
arbitrage between CDS and equity markets and Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2012, [1]) for an example
on arbitrage between CDS and bond markets. A recent study by Jarrow et al (2018, [19]) focused
on statistical arbitrages in the CDS term structure by identifying mis-pricing of CDSs based on
the gaps between theoretical CDS prices and observed ones; their results however are model-
dependent, contrary to ours.
There are potential implications of CDS-term-structure arbitrage for the pricing and risk man-
agement of both credit derivatives and general OTC derivatives, because of the requirement to
compute the valuation adjustments. Given the importance of the No-arbitrage assumption in de-
riving default probabilities from observed CDS curves in a presumably efficient CDS market, it is
important to understand to what extent this market is arbitrage-free. Do we see potential arbitrage
opportunities and are these being taken advantage of by arbitrageurs? As we will see, the answers
to this are, respectively, a ”yes” and a ”no”. These questions are of fundamental importance for
the pricing and risk management of credit derivatives and XVA.
2For finite period markets the existence of such a measure is equivalent to absence of arbitrage, but for general
continuous time markets in which prices are semi-martingales the latter has to be strengthened to for example the
NFLVR-condition of Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994) [15]; in this paper we will generally disregard such sub-
tleties.
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In the remainder of this introductory section we first present an overview of anomalous CDS
trades which violate the simplest of our No-arbitrage conditions and which motivated our study.
We then more formally list the research gaps we identified and the contributions we believe this
paper makes to the existing literature.
1.1 Anomalous CDS term structures
Let s1 and s2 be the mid-point CDS spreads of two co-initial standard single-name CDS contracts
starting at T0 with maturities T1 < T2 but otherwise being identical3. According to Theorem 1 in
section 2, Absence-of-Arbitrage (AoA) in the CDS market implies that:
(T1 − T0)s1 < (T2 − T0)s2. (1)
We will call the pair of CDS trades for which (1) is violated an Arbitrage Trade or more briefly an
Anomaly. Note that in that case, necessarily s1 > s2, so the CDS curve is inverted. Inverted yield
curves are well-studied by researchers but inverted CDS curves have not attracted much attention
from researchers. O’Kane (2008, [21]) remarked that model-independent arbitrage may exist in
the CDS market and that negative implied default probabilities can occur for inverted CDS curves.
He stated a condition similar to (1) but in a form and with a derivation which suggests it is only
holds approximatively, while it is in fact exact. Brigo and Mercurio [8] (2006) also commented on
the possibility of negative hazard rates as a result of inverted CDS curves. However, no systematic
study has been conducted to assess the significance of this an issue and its implications for OTC
derivatives.
In the case of an anomaly violating (1) as described above, an arbitrageur would simultaneously
sell the protection against the default of an entity (”Short the CDS”) for a rate s1 over the period
of T1 − T0 and buy the default protection against the same entity (”Long the CDS”) for a rate of
s2 over the period T2 − T0. We refer to this as a paired arbitrage trade, denoted informally by
3It means identical vintage, underlying bond, seniority type, currency and notional, etc. in ISDA master agreement.
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((s1,T1); (s2,T2)) .
We now turn to identify potential arbitrage opportunities by checking a list of paired trades
((s1,T1); (s2;T2)) against condition (1) with the focus on single-name CDS contracts traded be-
tween January of 2007 and June of 2010, which includes the official beginning and end of the
2007-09 crisis 4. For this study, we have sourced CDS data from BloombergTMand Thomson
Reuters.
Our data sample is comprehensive in that it contains over 3 million CDS curves, each with 8
CDS contracts of different maturities (i.e., 6-month, 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year, 5-year, 7-year
and 10-year) traded over 868 consecutive trading dates5. From these CDS trade data, we then
identify a list of paired CDS trades that violate condition (1) with focus on the following four
paired maturities: (T1,T2) := {(0.5, 1), (1, 2), (2, 5), (5, 10)}, where maturities are measured in
years. We therefore note that our analysis in terms of paired maturities is not exhaustive.
Table 1 presents a summary of the number of anomalies (indicated below in brackets) based
on the following five attributes: (i) across three major regions, i.e., Asia (42), Europe (295) and
North America (2,079); (ii) across sector groups, i.e., Banking (187) and Non-banking (2,229);
(iii) across three major currencies, i.e., USD (1,836) and EUR (579) and GBP(1); (iv) across
rating class groups, i.e., Investment-grade (1,863), Non-investment grade or NIG (180) and Not
Rated (373); (v) across seniority types for the debt obligation underlying a CDS trade, i.e., Senior
(2,385), Senior Secured (12) and Subordinated (19). We note that
• As regards regions, the North American region has higher percentage (86%) of anomalies
than others. We believe this is mainly due to two reasons: in our CDS data sample, 64% of
CDS trades have their underlying entities operating in this region; furthermore, the sample
period of our CDS data includes the on-going financial crisis that affected the North Ameri-
can region more than the others regions, which may have contributed to the observed higher
proportion of anomalies for the region.
4See National Bureau of Economic Research: http://www.nber.org/cycles.html for a definition of US eco-
nomic cycles
5We avoid data manipulations such as term interpolations to ensure that our data truly reflect the CDS market.
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Table 1: # of Anomalies by Regions, Sectors, Currencies, Credit Ratings and Seniority Types
• Regarding sector groups, the 2,229 anomalies in the Non-banking sector corresponds to
92.3% of the total number of anomalies.
• As for rating groups, 1,863 or 77.1% anomalies are associated with Investment-grade debt,
leaving the remaining non-negligible number of anomalies associated with either Non-investment-
grade or Not-rated debt. For reasons which are further discussed in section 4, non-negligible
numbers of anomalies are associated with either AAA-rated (36) or AA-rated (222) names.
• With regard to seniority, almost all anomalies are associated with either senior or senior
secured debt, suggesting debt seniority type (junior versus senior) may not be a determining
factor explaining the existence of anomalies in our sample.
To sum up, we have presented a cross-sectional overview of CDS-term-structure arbitrage op-
portunities identified in this study; in section 4, we present further evidences of such anomalies
across time and discuss the implications.
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1.2 Research Gaps and Contributions
Before we move to the next section, we present a summary of the research gaps which motivated
our study and list the contributions we believe this study makes to literature.
Research gaps
We identified the following research gaps in existing literature:
1. The existing literature valuation adjustment literature assumes that the CDS market, which
is the basis for the calibration of counterparty default probabilities, is arbitrage-free. Given
the importance of valuation adjustment calculation for OTC derivatives, it is important to in-
vestigate whether the CDS market is truly arbitrage-free; if not, it is important to understand
how significant the arbitrage opportunities are, how persistent such opportunities are, why
would-be arbitrageurs are not taking advantage of them and what the implications are for
OTC derivatives pricing and risk management.
2. Past CDS-arbitrage related literature focused on either CDS-bond arbitrage or CDS-equity
arbitrage. No systematic study has been conducted to identify and explain CDS-term-
structure arbitrage except for a recent paper by Jarrow et al (2018, [19]), where, however,
the authors focused on statistical arbitrage using a model-dependent approach.
3. Although O’Kane [21] (2008) and Brigo and Mercurio [8] (2006) commented on the po-
tential occurrence of negative hazard rates in the calibration of default probabilities to CDS
curves, no systematic study of arbitrage opportunities in the CDS term structure and of its
implications for the pricing and risk management of OTC derivatives has been conducted to
date. For example, there does not seem to exist a basically model-free mathematical criterion
for a CDS curve to be arbitrage free.
Contributions
We summarize the main contributions of our paper:
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1. The paper represents the first systematic study of CDS-term-structure arbitrage on the basis
of a simple model-independent criterion for No-arbitrage, supported by empirical evidence
and numerical examples based on real data.
2. The No-arbitrage conditions we derive are basically model-independent, assuming at most
the existence of an equivalent martingale measure, and sometimes not even that.
3. It shows that violating these conditions can lead to either negative or greater-than-1 con-
ditional default probabilities, which has implications for the pricing and risk management
of both credit derivatives and OTC derivatives in general, through the computation of value
adjustments such as CVA and DVA.
4. It argues that an explanation of these apparent arbitrage opportunities can be found in the
presence of implicit risks and costs which were systematically neglected in the practice of
OTC-derivatives pricing prior to the crisis of 2008-9 and which have since become the focus
of research efforts of academics, and practitioners through the inclusion of various valuation
adjustments, and that taking these into account in the calculation of CDS spreads should
reduce arbitrage opportunities in the CDS market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we derive the No-arbitrage condition
(1) for a CDS term structure with zero modelling assumptions, under the assumption that risk-free
rates are non-negative. We do this first (by way of example) for a simple three period model, and
then for the continuous time case with both continuous and discrete protection payments. In section
3, we use the existence of an Equivalent martingale Measure to derive a No-arbitrage condition for
a general interest rate environment, with potentially negative short rates, which generalizes (1)
if interest rates are positive. In section 4 we present further empirical evidence for CDS-term-
structure anomalies and the existence of arbitrage profits. We present numerical examples of the
implications of such anomalies for conditional default probabilities. Finally, section 5 concludes.
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2 No-arbitrage conditions on CDS Term Structure
We consider a co-initial family of CDS contracts providing protection against the default of a
reference entity between times T0 and T for arbitrary T > T0. The default protection seller pays
the buyer the Loss-Given-Default should the default occur within [T0,T] in exchange for either a
continuously or discretely paid spread of st(T0;T), which is fixed at the inception of the contract
and paid by the buyer up till time-of-default τ or up till the contract’s maturity T, whichever is
smaller. Here t < T0 is the time at which the spread is agreed upon between the two parties of
the CDS. We are interested in potential static arbitrage opportunities presented by the CDS term
structure or CDS curve {st(T0,T) : T ≥ T0} at any fixed time t, which, without loss of generality,
we can take to be t = 0 (corresponding to ”today” or ”now”). Dynamic No-arbitrage conditions
for the stochastic evolution of these curves as function of t are outside of the scope of the present
paper.
2.1 No-arbitrage condition for discretely paid CDS rates: a simple example
We first look at a simple discrete time model, with times 0, 1, 2 and 3. To further simplify, we as-
sume that interest rates are 0 (this will be relaxed in the next section). Suppose that the defaultable
bond underlying the CDS contract is a 0-coupon bond with maturity T = 3 and nominal value 1,
and that the reference entity has a strictly positive risk-neutral probability of default before matu-
rity. We assume of course that the entity has not yet defaulted at the trade date t = 0 of the contract:
P(τ > 0) = 1. Consider two CDS contracts, CDS1 and CDS2, both starting at time t = 1 (the Ef-
fective Date of the CDS). with CDS1 providing protection against default at t = 2 for a spread of
s1, and the second contract, CDS2, providing protection against default at times t = 2 and t = 3
for a spread of s2. The spreads are agreed upon at time 0, and therefore known. Let Rτ ∈ [0, 1) be
the, possibly random, recovery-upon-default at the time-of-default, which we assume to be strictly
positive.
Suppose that s1 ≥ s2, corresponding to an inverted CDS curve with short-term protection being
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more expensive than long-term one, and that we short the first CDS, in the sense that we sell
protection against default at time T2 for a fee of s1 payable6 at T2, and go long the second one, so
that we are buying default protection against a fee of s2 payable at T2 and T3, assuming no default
has yet occurred at the payment times. Our initial investment at time 0 (initial net cashflow) is 0,
since the contracts have not started yet. If τ = 1, both contracts are cancelled on their Effective
Date. If τ > 1, we receive s1−s2 at time 2. If default happens at time 2, the payments-upon-default
of the two CDS contracts cancel out, while if τ > 2 we have to pay s2 at T = 3. If τ = 3, we
receive 1 − R3 from the protection seller of the second contract. These are all the possibilities
for τ. Assuming we carry along all received payments in a savings account, our net accumulated
cash-flow at time 3 then equals
(s1 − s2)1{τ>1} − s21{τ>2} + (1 − R3)1{τ=3} ≥ (s1 − 2s2)1{τ>1} + (1 − R3)1{τ=3}.
Hence we have an arbitrage opportunity if
s1 − 2s2 ≥ 0, (2)
assuming that E((1−R3)1τ=3) > 0 (if not, then there will always be an arbitrage if s1 > 2s2). Note
that, in fact, the net value of the position is non-negative at all intermediary times.
Remark 1. If the CDS spread curve is not inverted, s1 ≤ s2, then by shorting the CDS with the
higher spread and going long the other CDS, the net amount we will have received at time 3 is
(s2− s1)1{τ>1}+ s21{τ>2}− (1−R3)1{τ=3}: the situation is different from the previous case of inverted
spreads, since 1 − R3 now occurs with a minus sign.
It is instructive to examine the above example from the viewpoint of risk-neutral pricing. Let
Q be an equivalent martingale measure and suppose that the conditional risk-neutral probabilities
6We follow the convention that protection payments for a given period are done at the end of the period.
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of default over each period are constant:
Q(τ = i|τ > i − 1) = λ, i = 1, 2, 3,
while Q(τ > 0) = 1. Furthermore, assume that the loss-given-defaults Lt > 0 at t = 2, 3 are
constant; if the reference entity for the CDS is a zero-coupon bond of face value 1, then Lt = 1−Rt.
We will see that if (2) holds, then λ either has to be negative or strictly bigger than 1. The fair value
at time 0 of the first spread is determined by
s1Q(τ ≥ 2) = L2Q(τ = 2)⇔ s1 = L2λ,
since Q(τ ≥ 2) = Q(τ ≥ 2|τ > 1)Q(τ > 1|τ > 0) = 1 · (1 − λ) = (1 − λ) and, similarly,
Q(τ = 2) = λ(1 − λ). The equation for the fair value of the second spread is
s2 (Q(τ ≥ 2) +Q(τ ≥ 3)) = L2Q(τ = 2) + L3Q(τ = 3),
or s2
(
(1 − λ) + (1 − λ)2) = λ(1 − λ)L2 + λ(1 − λ)2L3, so that
s2 = λ
L2 + (1 − λ)L3
2 − λ .
Observe that if L1 = L2 = L, then s1 = s2 = λL, and condition (2) would imply that s1 − 2s2 =
−λL < 0, or λ < 0, and our risk-neutral pricing model for pricing the CDS would break down.
More generally, letting x := L3/L2, we find that
s1 − 2s2 = −λL2λ + 2(1 − λ)x2 − λ ,
and the condition that s1 − 2s2 > 0 forces λ to be either strictly smaller than 0 or bigger than 1. (If
λ > 0, then the second factor of the product on the right has to be strictly negative, which forces
λ > 1, while if λ < 1, λ has to be negative because of the first factor; note that x > 0 since L1 and
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L2 are.)
Another way of deriving that Absence of Arbitrage implies that s1 ≤ 2s2 is by observing that
the risk-neutral expectation at time 0 of the pay-off of the difference of the two CDS contracts
(”short s1, long s2”) is
(s1 − s2)Q(τ > 1) − s2Q(τ > 2) + L3Q(τ = 3).
Since this has to be 0, and since the last term is positive, it follows that
(s1 − s2)Q(τ > 1) − s2Q(τ > 2) ≤ 0,
or
s1 ≤
(
1 +
Q(τ > 2)
Q(τ > 1)
)
s2 = (1 +Q(τ > 2|τ > 1)) s2, (3)
which certainly implies that s1 ≤ 2s2, since Q(τ > 2) ≤ Q(τ > 1). Note that (3) is sharper than
s1 ≤ 2s2 but that the latter makes no reference to survival probabilities. Inequality (3) would be
useful when we would have access to survival probabilities from another source than the CDSs
themselves, e.g. from defaultable bond yields.
2.2 No-arbitrage conditions for continuously paid CDS rates
We now put ourselves in a continuous-time framework, and consider a family of co-initial forward
CDS contracts providing default-protection over a future time periods [T0,T], with T0 ≥ 0 fixed
and T > T0 arbitrary. We let τ be the time of default. The party which is long the CDS (the buyer
of the default protection) will pay a protection fee between T0 and T up till default of the reference
entity, in which case he will receive the Loss-given-default (LGD). We will consider both the case
of a protection fee which is paid out continuously and one which is paid discretely, at payment
dates
t0 = T0 < t1 < · · · < tn−1 < T.
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In the first case the protection buyer pays a continuous fee at a rate of sdt up till time-of-default,
and in the second case he pays s(ti − ti−1) at time ti for i = 1, . . . ,n, with tn := T if ti ≤ τ, while
he only pays the spread over [ti−1, τ] if default τ occurs between ti−1 (excluded) and ti (included).
Here the CDS spread s = s0(T0,T) is determined at time 0 so that if T0 > 0 it is in fact a forward
spread.
Let (Lt)t≥0 be the loss-given-default or LGD process, with Lt the LGD if default happens at t. In
some of our results below Lt is allowed to be stochastic, in which case we will if necessary assume
it is adapted to the relevant filtrations generated by background processes such as the interest rate
process. We assume that, for all t > 0, Lt is non-negative, and strictly positive with a non-zero
probability: E(Lt) > 0, where the expectation can be taken with respect to the objective probability
measure, or an equivalent risk-neutral probability, if one exists. We will sometimes limit ourselves
to LGDs which are known in advance, though possibly time-dependent, in which case we will
write L(t) instead of Lt. Finally, we let (rt)t≥0 be the risk-free short-rate process.
Our first result generalizes the absence-of-arbitrage condition of the previous section to the
continuous-time setting, under condition of non-negative short-rates.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the risk-free short rate rt ≥ 0 a.s. and that T0 < τ ≤ T2 with positive
(objective) probability. If there is no arbitrage in the CDS market, and if the protection fee is paid
out continuously, then (T − T0)s(T0,T) is a strictly increasing function of T > T0:
(T2 − T0)s(T0,T2) > (T1 − T0)s(T0,T1) if T2 > T1 > T0. (4)
The same inequality holds with discretely paid protection fees, provided the protection-payment
dates of the two CDS contracts between T0 and T1 coincide.
Proof. Recall that an arbitrage opportunity over the time-horizon [0,T] is a process (Xt)t≥0 rep-
resenting a dynamic self-financing portfolio strategy which is bounded from below and has initial
cost X0 = 0, while at T, XT ≥ 0 a.s. and XT > 0 with strictly positive probability. Suppose now
14
that (4) is not satisfied for some T1 < T2:
(T2 − T0)s2 ≤ (T1 − T0)s1, (5)
where we have written s1 := s(T0,T1) and s2 := s(T0,T2), to simplify notations. Then, necessarily,
s2 < s1. We set up a portfolio strategy at time 0 by shorting the CDS for [T0,T1] and going long
the one for [T0,T2], and investing any cash earned into a savings account (as usual interpreted as
borrowing if the amount is negative). This strategy costs 0 to set up. We verify that its value at T2
is non-negative with positive expectation.
(i) Continuous protection payments. If default happens before or at T0, both contracts are cancelled,
and we receive nothing. If default happens before or at T1, the default payments of the two CDS
contracts will cancel out, and the value of our position at T2 will be
(s1 − s2)
∫ τ
T0
Bt,T2dt > 0,
where
Bt,T = e
∫ T
t rudu
is the savings account. If default occurs between T1 (excluded) and T2 (included), we receive
(s1 − s2)
∫ T1
T0
Bt,T2dt − s2
∫ τ
T1
Bt,T2dt + LτBτ,T2
≥ (s1 − s2)
∫ T1
T0
Bt,T2dt − s2
∫ T2
T1
Bt,T2dt + LτBτ,T2
≥ ((s1 − s2)(T1 − T0) − s2(T2 − T1))BT1,T2 + LτBτ,T2
= (s1(T1 − T0) − s2(T2 − T0))BT1,T2 + LτBτ,T2
≥ LτBτ,T2 ,
assuming (5), where we used that the risk-free rate is non-negative for the third line, so that Bt,T2 ≥
BT1,T2 if t ≤ T2 and Bt,T2 ≤ BT1,T2 if T1 ≤ t ≤ T2. Finally, if τ > T2, we receive the next to last line
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minus the LGD-term, which again is a non-negative amount. Since default will occur in (T0,T2]
with a positive probability, our gain at T2 is non-negative and strictly positive with a positive
probability, and since the value of our position is clearly bounded from below at intermediary
times (it is in fact non-negative at all times by essentially the same arguments), we have an arbitrage
opportunity. Note that our strategy is in fact a static one.
(ii) Discrete protection payments. Let T0 < t1 < · · · < tn1 = T1 be the payment dates for the CDS
contract over (T0,T1], which is augmented by payment dates T1 < tn1+1 < · · · < tn2 = T2 for the
CDS over (T0,T2]. If default has not yet happened at ti, then the protection fee for the sub-period
(ti, ti+1] is payed at ti+1. If s is the CDS-spread, his protection fee equals to s(ti+1 − ti) if default has
not yet occurred before ti+1, or s(τ− ti) if default occurred after ti but before or at ti+1. This can be
summarized by the formula
s(τ ∧ ti+1 − τ ∧ ti),
where a ∧ b := min(a, b). With this notation, the value of our strategy at T2 is
(s1 − s2)
n1−1∑
i=1
(τ ∧ ti+1 − τ ∧ ti)Bti+1,T2 − s2
n2−1∑
i=n1
(τ ∧ ti+1 − τ ∧ ti)Bti+1,T2 + LτBτ,T2 .
This value is clearly positive if τ ≤ T1, since s1 > s2, while if T1 < τ ≤ T2 , it is bounded from
below by
(s1 − s2)
n1∑
i=1
(ti+1 − ti)BT1,T2 − s2
n2−1∑
i=n1
(ti+1 − ti)BT1,T2 + LτBτ,T2
= BT1,T2[(s1 − s2)(T1 − T0) − s2(T2 − T1)] + LτBτ,T2
= BT1,T2[s1(T1 − T0) − s2(T2 − T0)] + LτBτ,T2 .
where we used that Bti+1,T2 ≥ BT1,T2 if i < n1 and Bti+1,T2 ≤ BT1,T2 otherwise. We therefore have an
arbitrage if inequality (4) is violated.

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Remark 2. The theorem remains valid if, in the discrete case, protection payments are made at
the time of default instead of at the end of the protection period in which default falls: this simply
amounts to replacing Bti+1,T2 by Bti+1∧τ,T2 in the proof above, which can be bounded from above or
below as before.
Also, we can slightly weaken our assumption on the payment dates of the two CDS contracts,
by supposing that the first contract has a set of payment dates {T0 < u1 < u2 < · · · < un1 = T1}
which contain the payment dates {T0 < T1 < · · · < tn1 < T1} of the second contract with spread s2
for that period, while T1 is a payment date for the second contract.
Indeed, suppose that T1 > ti = uk < uk+1 < · · · < u`−1 < u` = ti+1 and that τ > ti. If no default
occurs between ti and ti+1, then the value at T2 of our net protection payment for the period (ti, ti+1]
is
s1
`−1∑
j=k
(u j+1 − u j)Bu j+1,T2 − s2(ti+1 − ti)Bti+1,T2
≥ s1
 `−1∑
j=k
(u j+1 − u j)
Bu`,T2 − s2(ti+1 − ti)Bti+1,T2
= (s1 − s2)(ti+1 − ti)Bti+1,T2 ,
while if the time of default τ falls within this period, a similar analysis shows that this net value is
bounded from below by
(s1 − s2)(τ − ti)Bti+1,T2 .
Arguing as before, we find that we have an arbitrage opportunity if (4) does not hold.
3 Absence-of-Arbitrage conditions between CDS-rates and non-
defaultable bond prices
The proof of Theorem 1 above is completely elementary. We will now give a second proof which
uses the fundamental theorem of asset pricing, and which will also allow us to generalize this the-
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orem to the case where the risk-free rate can become negative. We will do so under a stronger
assumption than Absence-of-Arbitrage, namely the existence of an equivalent martingale mea-
sure (or risk-neutral pricing measure) Q with respect to which the time-of-default τ and the risk-
free short-rate process (rt)t≥0 are independent. In other words, we assume a reduced-form credit
risk model. An equivalent martingale measure exists assuming a suitably strengthened form of
Absence-of-Arbitrage, such as Delbaen and Schachermayer’s NFLVR condition (1994, [15]). We
will moreover assume, for a start that the protection is paid out continuously, at a rate of s0(T0,T),
and make some remarks on the case of discrete protection payments at the end of this section.
Denoting the risk-neutral survival probability by7
q(t) := Q(τ > t), (6)
the fair CDS spread at time 0 can these assumptions be expressed as
s(T) := s0(T0,T) =
EQ
(
Lτe−
∫ τ
0 rudu1T0<τ≤T
)
∫ T
T0
P0,tq(t)dt
, (7)
where P0,t := EQ
(
e−
∫ t
0 rudu
)
is the price at time 0 of a non-defaultable 0-coupon bond maturing at t.
Remark 3. If Lt =: L(t) is deterministic, the numerator equals
−
∫ T
T0
L(t)P0,tdq(t), (8)
This formula will still hold, with L(t) := EQ(Lt) if the LGD process is also independent of (rt)t, For
actual LGDs, such as those turning up in CVA calculations, the LGD is related to the present value,
at time-of-default, of future discounted cash-flows, and would therefore in general depend on the
short-rate process. If the CDS-contract sets the LGD is as a fixed fraction of a given nominal, it is
clearly constant.
7In a dynamic setting the spread as determined at t > 0 would be written as st(T0,T) and the correct survival
probabilities to use would be the conditional one, qt(u) = Q(τ > u|τ > t).
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To obtain a variant of Theorem 1 which holds if risk-free rates can be negative, it now suf-
fices to replace (T − T0) by what we will call the standardized (continuous-time) risk-free annuity
A0(T0,T)over [T0,T], defined as8
A0(T0,T) :=
∫ T
T0
P0,tdt. (9)
Theorem 2. Assume an equivalent martingale measure exists for the CDS market with respect to
which τ and (rt)t≥0 are independent. Then A0(T0,T)s0(T0,T) is an increasing function of T.
Proof. Writing A(T) and s(T) for A0(T0,T) and s0(T0,T), and also introduce
Ad(T) := Ad0(T0,T) :=
∫ T
T0
P0,tq(t) dt
which is what we might call a defaultable standardized annuity. Then clearly
Ad(T)s(T) = EQ
(
Lτe−
∫ τ
0 rudu1T0<τ≤T
)
is increasing in T, since 1T0<τ≤T is, so it suffices to show that A(T)/Ad(T) is increasing. But
∂
∂T
log
(
A(T)/Ad(T)
)
=
P0,T
A(T)
− q(T)P0,T∫ T
T0
P0,tq(t)dt
≥ 0,
since q(t) is decreasing, and therefore
∫ T
T0
P0,t q(t)dt ≥ q(T)
∫ T
T0
P0,tdt = q(T)A(T).

Remark 4. Theorem 2 implies Theorem 1 (modulo the stronger independence assumptions of the
8An annuity would pay a constant interest of c over a period [T0,T]; if c = 1, its present value at t = 0 is given by
(9).
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former), since
T − T0
A0(T0,T)
is an increasing function of T if the short-rate is non-negative a.s., since P0(t) is then decreasing in
t ≥ 0: this can be shown similarly by verifying that the derivative of the logarithm is non-negative.
Note that in this case, the conclusion of Theorem 2 is stronger than the one of Theorem 1 (see
also the graphical interpretation of these Absence-of-Arbitrage relations below). An advantage
however of (4) is that it is formulated purely in terms of the CDS spreads, without reference to the
risk-free yield curve.
3.1 A No-Arbitrage relation between CDS and IRS rates
We can reformulate Theorem 2 as a no-arbitrage relation in terms (continuously paid) Interest
Rate Swaps (IRS) rates. Recall that the fair (forward) rate for a continuously exchanged fixed-for-
floating IRS over [T0,T] is given by
I0(T0,T) =
P0,T0 − P0,T
A0(T0,T)
, (10)
with I0(T0,T0) := limT→T0+ I0(T0,T) = −P−10,T0∂P0,T/∂T|T=T0 , the T0-forward rate at time 0, where
we used (10).
Theorem 2 then implies that
(
P0,T0 − P0,T
)
s0(T0,T)/I0(T0,T) is an increasing function of T >
T0. Equivalently, if we introduce the T0-forward price F0(T0,T) := P0,T/P0,T0 , then we have the
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of theorem 2,
(1 − F0(T0,T)) s0(T0,T)I0(T0,T) (11)
is increasing in T ≥ T0.
One can go one step further, and express F0(T0,T) in terms of the IRS-forward rates: see
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Appendix A. This however involves a double integration of IRS-rates with respect to their maturity
variables, and the corollary suffices in practice, since we can observe forward bond-prices along
with forward IRS rates.
3.2 Graphical interpretation of the No-Arbitrage relations
The No-arbitrage condition of Theorem 1 has a simple graphical interpretation: suppose we have
a collection of observed rates si = s(T0,Ti) and that we plot the points si against xi := Ti − T0
in the (x, s)-plane. Take a point (xa, sa) and draw the hyperbola s = C/xa which passes through
this point (so that C = xa · sa). Then all points (xi, si) for which xi ≥ xa should lie above this
hyperbola, if not, there is an opportunity for arbitrage. In Figure 1, a CDS curve highlighted in
orange color is plotted against a hyperbola going through the (xa, si) where xa = 0.5 and sa = 400
basis points. Clearly, together with sa, any points si located below the hyperbola can form a paired
trade to construct arbitrage opportunity as in the proof of Theorem 1, which makes it easy to detect
such arbitrage opportunities at a glance.
Alternatively, one can do a log-log plot: log si against log xi, in which case the points (log xi, log si)
for which log xi > log ai should lie above the straight line with slope -1 which passes through
(log xa, log sa). The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates the graphical interpretation for Theorem 1 in
log-log scale.
A similar construction applies for Theorem 2: it suffices to plot si against Ai := A0(T0,Ti)
respectively log si against logAi.
3.3 Discrete protection payments
In practice, the protection leg of a CDS is paid discretely instead of continuously. If we consider
families of co-initial CDS-contracts with maturities and protection payment dates coming from a
discrete set of tenor-dates T0 < T1 < · · · < Tn < · · · , then the protection buyer of a CDS contract
whose maturity is Tn pays s(Ti ∧ τ − Ti−1 ∧ τ) at dates Ti for i = 1, . . . ,n: s(Ti − Ti−1) if default
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Figure 1: Geometric Interpretation for Arbitrage Condition - Theorem 1
hasn’t occurred yet, and s(τ − Ti−1) if Ti−1 < τ ≤ Ti. One can repeat the analysis to arrive at the
following result: let
An :=
 n∑
i=1
(Ti − Ti−1)P0,Ti
 ,
be the discrete-time standardized annuity, and let sn := s(T0,Tn) be the fair CDS spread. Then
Theorem 3. If an equivalent martingale measure exists and if τ is independent of the risk-free
interest rate process, then Ansn is an increasing function of n.
Proof. The fair spread now equals
sn =
EQ
(
Lτe−
∫ τ
0 rudu1T0<τ≤T
)
Adn
,
where
Adn :=
n∑
i=1
EQ(Ti ∧ τ) − EQ(Ti−1 ∧ τ)P0,Ti ,
and it again suffices to verify that An/Adn is increasing in n. Now an easy computation shows that
EQ(T ∧ τ) = Q(T), where
Q(T) :=
∫ T
0
q(u)du.
22
It follows that (Q(Ti) −Q(Ti−1))/(Ti − Ti−1) is decreasing in i, since
q(Ti)(Ti − Ti−1) ≤
∫ Ti
Ti−1
q(u)du = Q(Ti) −Q(Ti−1) ≤ q(Ti−1)(Ti − Ti−1),
and therefore
Q(Ti+1) −Q(Ti)
Ti+1 − Ti ≤ q(Ti) ≤
Q(Ti) −Q(Ti−1)
Ti − Ti−1 .
Now
An+1
Adn+1
− An
Adn
=
∑n
i=1 ((Tn+1 − Tn)(Q(Ti) −Q(Ti−1) − (Ti − Ti−1)(Q(Tn+1 −Q(Tn)))P0,TiP0,Tn+1
Adn+1A
d
n
,
and each term in the sum in the numerator is positive since (Q(Ti) − Q(Ti−1))/(Ti − Ti−1) ≥
(Q(Tn+1) −Q(Tn))/(Tn+1 − Tn) for i ≤ n.
One checks by a similar computation that if interest rates are non-negative, and P0,Tn therefore
is decreasing in n, then (Tn − T0)/An divided by the numerator is increasing in n, so that we find
as in section 2 that (Tn − T0)sn is increasing.
4 Further Empirical Evidence
Economists often cite inverted yield curves as signals for a pending economic crisis. However,
inversions for CDS-curves does seem not to have been systematically investigated in the literature.
In this section we present some further evidence for CDS anomalies summarized across the sample
period of our CDS data. We consider the implications of such anomalies for conditional default
probabilities.
4.1 CDS-term-structure anomalies across time
In section 1.1, we presented a cross-sectional overview of the CDS-term-structure arbitrages (or
anomalies) which fail the No-arbitrage condition of Theorem 1. We now take a further look at
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these anomalies across the same sample period using the same CDS data set, where we consider
contracts with T0 = 0, that is, starting on the day they are quoted. It is convenient to introduce the
Maturity Adjusted Spread Ratio or MAR, defined as
MAR := T1s(T1)/T2s(T2),
so that Theorem 1 there is arbitrage for the pair of traded if MAR > 1. Equivalently, there is
arbitrage if the slope s(T1)/s(T2) is bigger than or equal to the maturity ratio T2/T1. The MAR is a
metric for the strength of such an arbitrage opportunity.
Figure 2 graphs the total number of anomalies per month or Anomaly Counts in our dataset.
Figure 3 graphs these in red for each of the four maturity pairs we examined, together with the
MARs in blue to indicate the strength for arbitrage opportunities based on each maturity pair.
On the basis of these two figures and on Figure 4 and Table 2, we can make the following
observations:
1. We can distinguish three different phases in the anomalies count of Figure 2 which corre-
spond with three phases of the credit crunch: (i) a build-up phase, from July/August-2007
(when BNP Paribas terminated investors’ withdrawal from three of the hedge funds it ad-
ministered, often considered as the start of the crisis) to March-2008 (when US investment
bank Bear Stern collapsed), coinciding with the initial phase of the financial crisis; (ii) a
liquidity dry-up phase, from April-2008 to May-2009, during which the number of anoma-
lies decreased while the market was hit by the liquidity crunch; (iii) a post-crisis liquidity
recovery and market uncertainty phase, from June-2009 (the official ending of the crisis)
onwards during which, as funding and market liquidity recovered, the number of anomalies
increased as the market searched for directions amongst ongoing uncertainty, in part related
to regulatory reforms hanging over the financial markets. According to Battalio and Schultz
(2011, [3]), regulatory confusion and uncertainty created significant bid-ask spreads in the
equity option market, and the CDS market was not immune from this either.
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Figure 2: The number of Anomalies across time
2. Figure 2 shows that 8 out of the 12 peak-months (highlighted in Red) coincide with the ”Roll
Months”, which are the months containing so-called Roll Dates9. During the Roll Months,
the increased number of anomalies can at least partly be attributed to an increased number
of expiring and lack of liquid CDS contracts before the Roll Dates.
3. Across the four different arbitrage strategies of Figure 3, the ’6m-1yr’ maturity pair had
the highest number of arbitrages, 987, closely followed by 975 for the ’1yr-2yr’ pair. For
the ’2yr-5yr’ pair we found 151 arbitrage opportunities and for the ’5yr-10yr’ pair, 388. In
our data set, CDS-curve arbitrage opportunities occurred most frequently at the short-end
of the curve and less frequently for the longer maturity contracts, and the least for 5-year
term contracts which are the most liquidly traded. These observations are consistent with
an economic principle: when a name gets stressed, its CDS curve often gets inverted at the
short-end (such as the 6-month maturity) of the curve and tends to go back to be normally
upward-sloping after that. This is because investors tend to believe that if a stressed name
survives in the short-term, it will bounce back over longer terms.
4. Figure 3 also depicts the MARs in contrast with the reference line (y = 1 indicated by a dark
dotted line); as explained above, the greater the (monthly average) MAR number exceeds
9Our CDS contracts are of 1999/2003 ISDA formats; Roll Dates refer to the 20th of March, June, September and
December when less liquid off-the-run CDS contracts expire and more liquid on-the-run ones are traded.
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Figure 3: Anomaly Counts and Arbitrage Opportunity Strengths for Four Strategies
the reference line, the stronger or the more arbitrage-able the arbitrage opportunity can be.
Also, MARs tend to be less volatile than the anomaly counts, except for some outliers. For
example, the spike of 16.53 in the MARs shown in Table 2 for the ’2yr-5yr’ couple is caused
by Freddie Mac (a US home insurance company) because its 2-year CDS spread went up to
1538 basis points after Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy while its other spreads stayed normal
during the month of Sept-2008, as the market expected Freddie Mac to survive after the
short-run stress. (The market turned out to be correct: Freddie Mac survived after receiving
a governmental bailout.)
5. In Table 2, we present the average MAR of the anomalies for the four maturity pairs split
out by rating class. We excluded one anomalous trade related to Freddie Mac as an outlier
from the ’1yr-2yr’ and ’2yr-5yr’ pairs because it was rated AAA even as it received the US
government’s bailout. Figure 4 and Table 2 show that the MAR tends to increase when we
go from higher credit-quality ratings groups (AAA) to lower ones ( BBB or Non-investment-
26
Table 2: Arbitrageability/MARs across strategies and rating groups: numerical results
Figure 4: Arbitrageability/MARs across strategies and rating groups
Grade rated group (or NIG, ratings lower than), with the exception of the A-rated group for
all four strategies. This may be related to an observation of Biswas, Nikolova and Stahel
(2015, [4]), who found that CDS contracts on lower rated entities commanded a higher liq-
uidity premium. Such liquidity premia would disincentivise would-be arbitrageurs to take
advance of these arbitrage opportunities since it would make it costly to close out the arbi-
trage strategy prematurely should they wish to do so, explaining why such opportunities are
tolerated by the market.
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4.2 Numerical example of arbitrage profits across time: Microsoft 5yr-10yr
strategy
If two CDS contracts of different maturities, e.g., the 5-year and 10-year, are quoted on the market
with spreads s5yr, s10yr which violate the No-arbitrage condition of Theorem (1), we can construct
an arbitrage strategy by selling the 5-year default protection and at the same time buying the 10-
year default protection. Observing the market quotes for Microsoft on 03/12/2008, we form such a
strategy and calculate the Mark-to-Market value for two CDS contracts with notional amounts of
10 Million dollar each. Figure 5 presents the computed Mark-to-Market values (graphed in Green
from the right y-axis) from ISDA’s standard CDS model10 of the resulting strategy using CDS
market data from 03/12/2008 to 30/06/2010. We assume zero interest for the observation period,
given that interest rates were extremely low then. Besides, as shown in Appendix B, interest rate
levels only have a limited impact on CDS valuation.
At the inception of the strategy, the 5-year mid-CDS rate on 03/12/2008 is 89.53 basis points
while the 10-year one is 33.55 basis points, 89.5333.55 = 2.669 >
10
5 . The Mark-to-Market value is zero
on 03/12/2008, but raises to a strictly positive value immediately afterwards, and consistently stays
positive throughout the observation period.
Besides the Mark-to-Market value of our arbitrage strategy, Figure 5 also plots CDS rates (right
y-axis) for protection on Microsoft for eight different maturities, for each date between 31/10/2008
to 30/06/2010. The CDS rates for the 5-year and 10-year maturities are represented by solid lines in
red and brown and the other terms by dotted lines. Other spikes, where the 5-year CDS rate (in red)
overshoots the 10-year rate (brown) can be observed later in the period. The 5-year rate is more
volatile than the 10-year one, which is probably related to its greater liquidity. In particular, this
indicates that arbitrage opportunities like these are not one-offish, instead, they can be recurrent.
10based on a reduced form model for standard CDS as the one we use in Section 3; see for example O’Kane, 2008,
http://www.cdsmodel.com/cdsmodel/
28
Figure 5: CDS-Curve arbitrage Case Study: Microsoft (5yr10yr Strategy)
Figure 6: Curve-arbitrage Case Study: Microsoft (5yr10yr Strategy)
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Table 3: Numerical results of Hazard Rates for AIB (6m1yr) and Microsoft (5yr10yr) Strategy
Figure 7: Negative Hazard Rates for AIB (6m1yr) and Microsoft (5yr10yr) Strategy
4.3 Implications of Arbitrage: Nonsensical Default Probabilities
As we already noted in section 2, Remark 1, violation of the No-arbitrage condition of theorem
1 can lead to nonsensical conditional default probabilities as computed in a standard reduced-
form model. Observing that the CDS term structures for AIB on 04/12/2008 and Microsoft on
03/12/2008 respectively do violate this the No-arbitrage condition look at the implications for
each entity’s the conditional default probabilities, using a standard reduced-form model: the ISDA
standard CDS model. This model bootstraps piecewise constant conditional default probabilities
or hazard rates from a given CDS curve. Table 3 shows that the bootstrapped hazard rates for
4-year and 7-year terms for Microsoft are negative; also, the bootstrapped 1-year hazard rate for
AIB is negative (highlighted in red colors). In both cases, this violates the elementary definition of
a probability. Figure 7 depicts the same numerical results in a graph.
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4.4 CDS Term Structure and Credit Valuation Adjustment
We discuss the relation between CDS term structure arbitrage opportunities and CVA. In one di-
rection, the risk-neutral hazard rates and default probabilities which are used for the computation
of the CVA of a given OTC derivative contract are backed out from observed CDS curves. If these
curves present arbitrages in the sense of our theorems 1-3, these hazard rates can become negative,
which will result in an over-valuation of the CVA. Since CVAs are not traded, there are not likely
to be other consequences.
In the other direction, CVA costs can provide an explanation for why these arbitrage oportu-
nities are not exploited. Indeed, the would-be arbitrageur faces two kinds of counterparty credit
risks: that of the protection buyer of the smaller maturity CDS contract not paying all of his pro-
tection fees between T0 and T1 and that of the protection seller not paying the loss-given-default,
in particular for default occuring before T1, when this payment should compensate the loss-given-
default payment the arbitrageur himself should make. In other words, the CVA of the arbitrage
strategy will make its initial value negative instead of 0. Unaccounted counterparty credit risks to
be borne by a would-be arbitrageur can thus help to explain the existence of the significant and per-
sistent amount of CDS-term-structure arbitrage in our study. We note in this respect that Brigo and
Capponi (2014, [7]) show in an example that the impact of CVA on the Mark-to-Market value of
a 5-year single-name CDS payer contract can vary up to 60 basis points, depending on the default
correlation between the two parties.
In addition, other types of valuation adjustments can also explain the arbitrage opportunities
observed in our study in form of implicit costs and risks. For example, the counterparty credit
risk run by the arbitrageur may be alleviated through the posting of collateral (e.g. in a context
of centrally cleared contracts) but the arbitrageur himself would then have to post collateral also,
which then corresponds to a non-zero initial investment. Furthermore, liquidity risks might prevent
the arbitrageur to prematurely close-out his position. Biswas (2015, [4]) studied the liquidity risk
component in a real-world setting, as measured by the bid-ask spread for CDS contracts, based
on mainly post-crisis CDS market data. They found that the liquidity risk premiums for CDS
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contracts are between 12 and 14 basis points depending on whether the contracts are between a
dealer and another dealer or between dealer and a buy-side investor. they also found that an entity
with lower credit rating has to pay higher liquidity premiums. Since we use data from the time
period leading to and during the financial crisis, we expect the liquidity premiums for our mainly
dealer and buy-side investors (or end-users) trades to be higher than these numbers.
5 Conclusions & Research Directions
We derived criteria for absence of arbitrage in CDS term structures, under various assumptions
(discrete or continuous protection payments, interest rate environments which are positive or not)
with no or only minimal modeling assumptions. These criteria provide simple checks for arbitrage
opportunities in the CDS market. Based on these criteria and using a comprehensive data set, we
found that a significant amount of CDS-term-structure arbitrage opportunities existed in the CDS
market prior and during the financial crises.
Violation of the no-arbitrage conditions implies nonsensical conditional default probabilities
which will impact on the calculation of CVA and DVA. The existence of such arbitrage opportu-
nities is likely to be connected with hidden risks (counterparty credit risk, liquidity risk) and costs
(collateral) which prevents them to be exploited, and which prior to the 2007-09 crises were not
systematically taken into account in the pricing of OTC derivatives.
The progress being made in the theory and practice of the valuation adjustment should con-
tribute to the gradual disappearance of these arbitrage opportunities, as should the increase in
efficiency and transparency due to the standardisation of OTC derivative contracts and the use of
modern information technology. Furthermore, central clearing should contribute to greater liquid-
ity. The existence of arbitrage opportunities should therefore not discourage the financial com-
munity from continuing to use the CDS market for the calibration of counterparty default risks.
As possible directions for future research we mention the expansion of our study to maturity
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pairs other than the four we considered here, and other data sets. We also believe that our analy-
sis can be extended to cover sovereign CDS while accounting for the exchange rate between the
protection and premium legs in context of the so-called Quanto CDS; no study has been done on
the term-structure arbitrage of such contracts. On a theoretical level, it would be interesting to
characterise arbitrage-free CDS term structures: we mention here that one can construct examples
of curves which satisfy the criteria of theorems 1 and 2, but which nevertheless cannot be a CDS
curve in an arbitrage-free model. This is work in progress.
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A Forward bond-prices and IRS rates
Proposition 1. For T0 ≤ U ≤ T let
Φ0(U,T) := e−
∫ T
U I0(T0,V)dV. (12)
Then
F0(T0,T) = 1 − I0(T0,T)
∫ T
T0
Φ0(U,T) dU. (13)
In particular, the forward IRS curve uniquely determines the forward bond prices.
Corollary 2. If there is no arbitrage in the combined CDS - IRS market then (assuming the exis-
tence of an equivalent martingale measure)
T→
(∫ T
T0
Φ0(U,T)dU
)
s0(T0,T) (14)
is an increasing function on (T0,∞).
Proofs. The corollary follows by inserting (13) into (11). The proof of (13) we set up and solve an
ODE for the forward bond prices. We fix T0, and write I(T) for I0(T0,T) and F(T) for F0(T0,T).
On dividing both sides of the fundamental relation (10) by P0,T0 , we can rewrite this as
AF(T)I(T) = 1 − F(T),
where AF(T) := AF0(T0,T) :=
∫ T
T0
F(t)dt (which is nothing else but the forward price of A0(T0,T)).
Differentiation with respect to T gives −F′(T) = AF(T)I′(T) + F(T)I(T) = (1 − F(T))I′(T)/I(T) +
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F(T)I(T), where we used the fundamental relation again, or
F′ +
(
I − I
′
I
)
F = − I
′
I
.
This as a linear non-homogeneous ODE for F(T) for T > T0 with initial condition F(T0) = 1,
whose solution is given by (13).
We make some further observations:
1. In a dynamic setting relations such as the ones established here hold between st(T0,T) and/or
Pt,T and It(T0,T) and put restrictions on a joint dynamic CDS-IRS model which simultane-
ously tries to mode the swap and CDS rates.
2. If interest rates (instantaneous rates or forward rates in an HJM model) are non-negative, then
forward prices F0(T0,T) are decreasing in T, and consequently I0(T0,T)
∫ T
T0
Φ0(U,T)dU has
to be increasing in T: this puts a restriction on possible IRS forward curves at a given time
0. Similar conditions can be derived for CDS forward curves.
3. In an HJM model, forward prices can be expressed in terms of instantaneous forward rates
f0,T as
F0(T0,T) = e
− ∫ TT0 f0,UdU.
One can ask for a relationship between the f0,T’s and the forward swap rates I(T) = I0(T0,T).
Recall that
(1 − F)(I′/I) + FI = −F′ = f F,
where f (T) := f0,T. Differentiating this relation once more, and then using it to eliminate
the 1 − F-term form the resulting expression, we find a first-order Ricatti equation for the
forward rate f (T), T ≥ T0,
f ′ = f 2 + a f + b (15)
with a = (I′′/I′)− I = (log I′)′− I and b = −I′′I/I′ = −I(log I)′ and initial condition f (T0) =
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Figure 8: DV01, CR01 and MtM for Microsoft (5yr10yr Strategy)
I(T0) := limT→T0 I(T). The solution of this Ricatti equation is of course implicitly already
contained in (13), since the instantaneous forward rate is minus the logarithmic derivative of
the forward: f0,T = −∂TF0(T0,T)/F0(T0,T) for T > T0. However, in practice, one might also
solve this ODE numerically.
B Risk Sensitivities for the 5yr-10yr Microsoft Arbitrage Strat-
egy
Following O’Kane (2008), we measure the Interest Rate Risk Sensitivity by so-called DV01, which
measures the Mark-to-Market value denoted by V(r, s) changes with regard to 1 basis point parallel
shift for interest rate level or DV01 = V(r + 1, s) − V(r, s). Similarly, we measure Credit spread
risk sensitivity by CR01 as the Mark-to-Market value changes with regard to 1 basis point parallel
shift for CDS curve; i.e. CR01 = V(r, s + 1) − V(r, s). We note that: (1) Figure 8 displays the
DV01, CR01 together with MtM results for the 5yr10yr Arbitrage strategy of Microsoft described
above. (2) The DV01 for this strategy is between -103 and -11 dollars throughout the data period in
our sample; whereas, the CR01 for this strategy is between 4,761 and 4,870 dollars for the sample
period. Clearly, CR01 or credit risk instead of DV01 or interest rate risk is the main driver for the
MtM for this strategy. (3) We note that, the above observation can be generalized to all single-
name CDS; i.e., interest rate sensitivity for single-name CDSs is much smaller than credit spread
risk with regard to their respective rates.
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